This essay presents an interpretation of the juridical thought of Cicero, Hugo Grotius and Adam Smith. Focussing upon questions of property, capital accumulation and violence, the essay traces a tension within their writings between a social ethic of human fellowship and compassion, and, a theory of the utility of 'unsocial' commercial selfinterest. This tension forms a key problem for the tradition of liberal international law. For Grotius and Smith one response to this tension is to attempt to reign in capitalist markets by asserting a range of moral duties to individuals and to the nation-state. The importance of stressing such an interpretation is to reject the flattening-out of the liberal political and juridical tradition by contemporary neoliberal thought, and to reclaim a number of ways of thinking about the global economy and international law in which moral action and political intervention are understood as playing a necessary and essential role.
Introduction
When thinking about the broad conceptual structure of modern international law, the political and juridical tradition of 'liberalism' has played a key role in shaping the direction of international law across the 20 th and 21 st centuries. There are of course a number of disparate ancient, early modern and modern intellectual lineages which serve as the conceptual building blocks or foundations of 'liberal international law' 1 and the global liberal political and juridical utility of private property, self-interest and commercial relations. In the Western juridical tradition this tension is primarily enunciated within Aristotle's (384-322 BCE) defence of private property. In the Politics Aristotle set out a theory of the social utility of private property which, when combined with a basic functional and geographic division of labour, exchange and trade, is portrayed as the best means of providing for the necessities of life. However, Aristotle argued also that the desire for property and wealth-getting for its own sake was not a virtue and leads instead to social ills and moral corruption. In this respect an excessive and egoistic focus upon wealth accumulation would be contrary to an ethical conception of the 'good life'. 8 This tension can also be seen to be present within middle and later periods of Stoic natural law philosophy in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, 9 and is present also within early Christian theology in disputes over wealth and poverty. Such an account helps to highlight the existence of a number of conflicting lineages present within the tradition of liberal international law. Hence, alongside belligerent theories of international law, theories of a global cosmopolitan legal order, and projections of a global order of unrestrained markets, commerce and free trade, resides a moral theory of Grotius which attempts to limit commercial and state antagonism through an ethic of human fellowship.
In contrast to a neoliberal inheritance of Smith, sits a theory of wealth generation put in service to a republican and statist idea of 'love of country', and a historical sociology which links capital accumulation and state formation to the process of interstate rivalry and war. Drawing out these conflicting lineages is important for demonstrating points of diversity within the intellectual history of the tradition of liberal international law. Such an effort is necessary also as a means of resisting the flattening-out of the liberal political and juridical tradition by contemporary neoliberal thought.
Property, War and Natural Rights
The ancient Roman politician and philosopher Cicero can be seen as a figure who synthesised aspects of pragmatic Roman law and the more conceptual Stoic idea of natural law.
11 Cicero's On Duties (De Officiis) (44 BCE) 12 presents an ethical theory of natural law, property rights, rights of state and international law which still bears an important degree of influence within the Western juridical tradition. For Cicero, the Stoic idea of a universal natural law extends to all peoples, it includes within it the ius gentium, the 'law of nations.' 13 This natural law based ius gentium represents something of a moral standard of justice, an international law built upon a fellowship of humanity. Cicero's idea of the ius gentium contains a set of moral duties which are meant to guide the actions of states. One key duty which is stipulated by natural law (governing both individuals and states) is the obligation to preserve one's self against harm (self-preservation), and the corresponding duties not to harm others or to arbitrarily take their property. Further, natural law also includes a duty of rectifying injustices and of defending those who have been unjustly harmed. 14 Within this account Cicero describes the emergence of private property out the original, pre-political or 'natural' condition of common property:
11 See generally: Douzinas, C. : Cambridge University Press, 1972) . At pp. 104-5 Jolowicz and Nichols describe how in this 'theoretical' meaning of the ius gentium Cicero generally follows Aristotle. Further that the 'theoretical' meaning of the ius gentium differed from its 'practical' use in Roman law facilitating contracts and property exchanges between Romans and foreigners. 14 Cicero, On Duties, pp. 9-10; 108-9. Of justice, the first office is that no man should harm another unless he has been provoked by injustice; the next that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one's own. Now no property is private by nature, but rather by long occupation (as when men moved into some empty property in the past), or by victory (when acquired in war), or by law, by settlement, by agreement, or by lot.... Consequently, what becomes each man's own comes from what had in nature been common, each man should hold onto whatever has fallen to him. If anyone else should seek any of it for himself, he will be violating the law of human fellowship. 15 Cicero's account of natural law involves both a justification of the historical emergence of private property out of the commons (via occupation, war, and agreement), and a defence of private property, in the sense that natural law proscribes a duty not to take another person's property. Cicero condemned those in Rome who had attempted to introduce popular agrarian reform, and the abolition of debt for the sake of the public welfare, and saw such moves as creating instability and civil war which could ruin a republic. 16 For Cicero the idea of land redistribution and the abolition of debt ran contra to the Roman idea of citizenship and Roman law which for a citizen involved a "free and unworried guardianship of his possessions." 17 Further, such acts were conceived by Cicero as contrary to natural sociability. He argued that to take something from another, to increase one's advantage by disadvantaging another, and do so by theft or violence is to destroy the common life and fellowship of men. 18 In this respect the importance of private property remained central, and even if it had historically emerged via seizure or war, once established by the civil law it was to be protected. It is permitted to us -nature does not oppose it -that each man should prefer to secure for himself rather than for another anything connected with the necessities of life. However, nature does not allow us to increase our means, our resources and our wealth by despoiling others. The same thing is established not only in nature, that is in the law of nations, but also in the law of individual peoples, through which the political community of individual cities is maintained: one is not allowed to harm another for the sake of one's own advantage.
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For Cicero, these prohibitive and positive duties extend to the field of war and help to delineate a legitimate from an illegitimate war under the concept of the 'just war'. He considered a just war to be generally a war of defence, and one waged with the idea of peace in mind. 21 Cicero's natural law idea of just war thus provides a sense of moral and legal restraint upon the use of violence, it appears as a normative criteria of the ius gentium used to limit or restrain acts of war otherwise carried out for power, territorial and commercial interests.
However, in Cicero's idea of the ius gentium, two opposing values -a universal law of nature, and the communal good of the Roman republic 22 -are combined in a variety of contradictory ways. Set quite starkly in contrast to the Stoic idea of a universal fellowship of humanity (together with the duties not cause injury to others, and not to take their property), the power and glory of Cicero's Rome had been built upon a history of aggressive military expansion and incorporation of subject peoples on the Italian peninsular, and upon the military and 19 Ibid, pp. 27-28; 58-59. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid, pp. 14-15. 22 Ibid, pp. 9-10; 21-24.
commercial domination of the Mediterranean. Rome's culture inherited the Greek celebration of the ideal of the martial virtue of the citizen-soldier whose glory lay in selfless combat and death for the republic. Further, Rome's economy had increasingly depended upon slave labour and upon an incessant outward expansion for territory, for the control of trade, and for the capture of human bodies whose forced slave-labour sustained an economy that powered the Roman political-military machine.
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While Cicero's idea of a just war included the old Greek notion of an honourable struggle amongst rivals for glory, power and reputation, he overlaid this account with a Stoic moral universalism which portrayed the creation and protection of the Roman Empire as largely beneficent and as a series of wars fought 'justly' in self-defence, for the protection of allies, and against treacherous and threatening enemies. 24 In Cicero's use, the concepts of natural law and ius gentium were deployed then partly as an apology for empire and as a rhetorical tool used to clothe an imperial war machine in the garments of moral duty and a universal natural law. Cicero's idea of just war spoke the language of humanity and human fellowship but exclusively represented Rome's military and commercial interests. Such a notion was not itself a contradiction for Cicero's republican thought, he had argued that while one may possess a general duty of fellowship to humanity, one's immediate and over-riding duty was always to the immediate political community, to the city-state, and in his case, to Rome. 25 Hence, in contrast to passages where Cicero draws upon the notion of the just war to restrain violence, he praises the violent acts of those who have increased Rome's power. He argued:
(B)y whatever means they can, whether in war or at home, to increase the republic in power, in land and in revenues. Such are the deeds of men who are great; such deeds were achieved in our forefathers' day. Men who pursue these kinds of duties will win, along with the utmost benefit to the republic, both great gratitude, and great glory for themselves.
26

Grotius, Property and International Law
The of equity and love, whereby a just equality would not have been observed either in their labour or in the or in the consumption of their fruits and revenues.
Thus also we see what was the original of property, which was derived not from a mere internal act of the mind, since one could not possibly guess what others designed to appropriate to themselves, that he might abstain from it; and besides, several might have had mind to the same thing, at the same time; but it resulted from a certain compact or agreement; either expressly as by a division; or else tacitly, as by seizure. For as soon as living in common was no longer approved of, all men were supposed, and ought to be supposed to have consented, that each should appropriate to himself, by right of first possession, what could not have been divided.
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Within this passage Grotius repeats a historical justification of private property developed much earlier by Cicero. Yet, there is another sense in which Grotius adds to the natural rights tradition by casting private property as a 'natural right'. 47 He did so via expanding upon a set of earlier Aristotelian arguments, by emphasising the trans-historic role of 'natural necessity'
and intensifying the role of social utility as it operated through the 'division of labour'. 48 In this account the emphasis upon the drive for self-preservation, for comfort, for the betterment of the human condition through the use of tools, land, exchange and trade operates as if it were a form of 'natural reason'. In this sense Grotius argued that private property was a 'natural right', even if this was not the case in the original natural condition and was a product of history.
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This natural right to property had to be protected and it was one of the roles of the state to do so.
Grotius' justification of the role of private property reflected a practical understanding of the This account links also with Grotius' emphasis upon a natural law and republican idea of maintaining forms of non-privatised, common property, such as oceans and seas, which are needed to maintain the public good of all peoples. 63 In this manner the Stoic sense of compassion, the Aristotelian republican ethic concerned with a socially-orientated good life, and the Christian idea of charity all played an important role in the way Grotius attempted to morally frame private property relations. On this account private property rights are not absolute and instead reside within an ethically-bounded political and social context in which, at times, certain forms of common ownership and political duty have precedence.
One way then of interpreting the tension in Grotius between an ethic of human fellowship and an unsocial commercial sociability, would be to read Grotius as accepting the existence of selfish and jealous passions within human social relations, and asserting against this a universal framework of natural law to guide humans towards more appropriate forms of moral behaviour.
For Grotius, such a universal moral framework aimed at the respecting of rights and redress and punishment of wrongs is the basis of international law and the law of war. On this account one chief role of international law is to help render the 'natural' relation of private property rights and global commerce as peaceful as possible.
Grotius' account envisages a global set of individual human rights to life and private property sitting alongside the rights of states which are treated as if they are human individuals with rights and duties. Individual and corporate rights to life (self-preservation, sovereignty) and to property, as well as jointly held rights over the commons (oceans), are to be guaranteed by international law, and when infringed are to be defended by force via 'just war'. 64 This vision of international law justifies free trade in principle, but also allows states to close-off spheres of mutual economic interest when built upon commercial contracts and mutual consent. 65 In a very broad sense Grotius' takes the Stoic-Ciceronian concepts of self-preservation, the duty not to harm others, the respect of contracts, treaties, private property and common property, and uses these to reimagine and project a global juridical space consistent with 17 th century commercial and trade relations.
Grotius' conception of the law of war inherits natural law accounts that went before him, such as that developed by Francisco de Vitoria, 66 in which the 'just war' is traditionally understood as a war of self-defence and self-preservation. 67 Such an account rejects Cicero's argument that war could be waged for the 'glory' of a republic and empire, and describes as 'unjust' wars aimed at territorial conquest, religious conversion or launched to pre-empt the rising threat of an adversary. 68 Further, Grotius described as unjust the act of war which claimed a rightful ownership of territory because the inhabitants were wicked, lacked intelligence or had false religious beliefs. 69 For Grotius, war may only generally be waged to avenge an injury 70 and should be done in a proportionate way, 71 and with a degree of prudence rather than recklessness. 72 Built into this account also is notion which resembles the contemporary idea of the 'responsibility to protect' whereby contained within the idea of 'punishment', 73 the 'just war' could be considered as a defence of the natural rights of others. This was the idea that states could intervene to protect vulnerable others suffering from the abuse of their natural rights. 74 Such a notion sits somewhat uncomfortably within Grotius' theory of just war and reflects perhaps an earlier, more expansionist account of war developed in The Free Sea, where
Grotius had argued that war could be fought "for the freedom and liberty of all mankind." were seen to take place as a consensual, social act. Occupation and possession generate private property rights only through the inter-subjective acts of others who consent to and affirm these rights. Grotius argued that the generation of a private property right cannot merely be an "internal act of mind", but that it comes about through "compacts and agreements" and the "division" of property through "consent." 76 However, there is sense within Grotius' account which alludes to a less consensual basis for the creation of private property rights, that is, to a form of 'consent' which is not given on precisely equal and free terms. Grotius alludes to this when he speaks of the creation of private property rights via 'tacit consent' and 'seizure.' 77 In describing an initial division and 73 Grotius, H. The most antient Arts were those of Agriculture, and Feeding Cattle; they were exercised by the first Brothers, so that there was between them some Sort of Division of Goods. The Diversity of Inclination, immediately produced Jealousy, and afterwards Murder.
80
In the earlier The Free Sea (1609), Grotius' account of the historical and 'natural' justification of private property is followed by a quote from Seneca' 95 Ibid, pp. 14-15, Smith referring to the transition from hunting to shepherding:
In the process of time, as their numbers multiplied, they would find the chase too precarious for their support. They would be necessitated to contrive some other method whereby to support themselves... The most naturally contrivance they would think of, would be to tame some of those wild animals they caught...
At p, 15, Smith referring to the transition from shepherding to agriculture:
But when society becomes too numerous they would find difficulty supporting themselves by herds and flocks. Then they would naturally turn themselves to the cultivation of land and the raising of such plants and trees as produced nourishment for them.
At pp. 15-16, Smith referring to the transition from agriculture to commerce:
As society was further improved, the several arts, which at first would be exercised by each individual as far as was necessary for his welfare, would be separated; some persons would cultivate one and others others, as they severally inclined. They would exchange with one another what they produced more than was necessary for their support, and get in exchange for them the commodities they stood in need of and did not produce themselves. Laws and government may be considered in this and indeed in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress the poor, and preserve to themselves the inequality of goods which would otherwise be soon destroyed by the attacks of the poor, who if not hindered by the government would soon reduce the others to an equality with themselves by open violence. The government and laws hinder the poor from ever acquiring the wealth by violence which they would otherwise exert on the rich; they tell them they must either continue poor or acquire wealth in the same manner as they have done.
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For Smith the different forms of inequality historically emerge within herding, under agriculture, within slave owning societies, and then via the operation of wage labour within commercial societies. All of these cases stand in sharp contrast to the relative degree of equality portrayed in hunter-gather societies at a point where private property was non-existent or minimal, and in contrast also to the degree of equality projected onto the idea of citizenship within ancient republics (both cases animating Rousseau's moral objections to inequality).
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In a sense, Smith's historical reconstruction of property relations frames law, government and private property as both a 'wrong' and as 'right'. Property and government emerge historically through force, violence and seizure, but then are reconceived in each historical moment by the holders of property as the legitimate form of juridical and political relations.
By historically reconstructing the development of juridical and social-property relations as involving violence and seizure, and the domination of the poor by a 'class' of property owners, The first and chief design of every system of government is to maintain justice; to prevent the members of society from incroaching on one another's property, or seizing what is not their own. The design here is to give each one the secure and peacable possession of his own property.
of providing for the needs of society than any levelling or redistributive, egalitarian politics built on love and compassion such as that propounded by Rousseau. For Smith, self-interested, commercial action operates as an "invisible hand" which has the unintended consequence of advancing the interests of society.
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Istvan Hont argues that Smith's metaphor of the 'invisible hand' is used to show how the selfinterested condition of private property relations operates to unlock the productive powers of human labour in a way that could not be matched by egalitarian arrangements which otherwise struggled to feed populations under conditions of high population growth. 111 Hont argues:
It was the productivity of workers and the goods available for consumption per capita, he argued, that were the true indicators of economic success. Such indicators were high in most well-managed modern economies based on private property, Smith wrote, and miserably low in egalitarian alternatives. Therefore the egalitarian and levelling politics of envy deserved no serious attention from those who constructed a new science of the legislator. What really mattered was not inequality but the decent living standard of all, including the poorest stratum of society.
This argument constituted the "paradox of commercial society." The economic efficacy of inequality was a paradox because it drove a wedge between the traditional egalitarian intuitions of Western moral thought and the guiding assumptions of modern political economy. The success of commercial society was counterintuitive to those who expected that political and economic equality must somehow proceed hand in hand.
The new idiom suggested, instead, that legal and political equality could coexist with economic inequality without causing endemic instability in modern Western states. "Liberalism," as this new political form came to be called in the next century, could even be defined by the coexistence of political and legal equality and significant economic inequality in the very same polity and society. This was the truly modern feature of the "modern republics" that have emerged in the modern era, for traditional political wisdom assumed that republics had to be egalitarian, and democracies even more so. Smith accepted the spectacular inequalities of modern society both morally and politically because they were not only compatible with, but indeed the prerequisite of, a society's capacity to provide welfare even for its poorest working members. The poorest workers in a modern commercial state enjoyed a better standard of living than even the richest members of undeveloped societies or of any past society. as an important and productive part of an economic system of self-interest. The desire for wealth, capital investment and market rationality generate both private wealth and social utility by raising the living standards of all members of society through the efficient production and 113 Smith, A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 216-8. Smith refers to the desire for creating a beautiful and magnificent system of government, the 'spirit of system', which has the unintended consequence of creating a greater degree of public happiness. 114 Smith, A. pragmatic theory of political and economic governance. In proposing a 'science of the legislator', 123 Smith's concern is to demonstrate how a government can protect the population from famine, scarcity and external threat, and generate happiness via fostering economic growth. The form of statecraft invoked is based on the art of mobilising, as a transformative power, self-interest, private property, the functional and geographical division of labour, and the free market. As such, Smith's approach to the tension between an ethic of human fellowship, moral sentiment, and commercial unsociability, is to put forward an art of governance which attempts to realise 'collective welfare' via mobilising and enabling individualistic economic desire. For Smith, however, the art of governance also aimed to balance this via restraining private and class interests when the desire for monopoly, profit and economic power threatened to undermine collective welfare and the national interests of the state.
124
The Pin Factory and the War Factory
Smith's arguments in favour of the global respect for individual rights, the respect for private property and for individual autonomy and choice within the economic realm, express a version of liberal cosmopolitanism. 125 In his argument against mercantilism and in favour of global free trade Smith offered a critique of how the adoption of policies of mercantilism had turned economic competition into interstate war. Smith argued that commerce, which ought to be a "bond of union and friendship" between individuals and nations, has become the "most fertile source of discord and animosity". Smith's approach however only involved, at most, a 'weak' cosmopolitanism which accepted that citizens and subjects will generally favour their own state in its interaction with others. For
Smith, the bonds of sympathy within the 'love of country' were stronger than the 'love of humanity'. 132 Further, the national political unit was viewed as the best mechanism of securing modern liberty. 133 In this respect Smith's account of global commercial relations, of individual rights to private property, economic autonomy and choice, of free markets and economic cooperation, was limited by a republican ethic of patriotism that had run alongside the natural law tradition since Aristotle and Cicero. This ethic of patriotism had the effect of causing interstate rivalry and conflict when the national ethic consistently trumped the humanitarian ethic.
As such, Smith's account of international economic competition, as a vision of humanitarian, cosmopolitan, market-based utility, sat alongside and in contradiction with, a republican ethic of patriotism which set states against each other and blinded them to any higher cosmopolitan interest. 134 This 'love of country' often drove states towards war. For Smith:
Independent and neighbouring nations, having no common superior to decide their disputes, all live in continual dread and suspicion of one another. Each sovereign, expecting little justice from his neighbours, is disposed to treat them with as little as he expects from them. The regard for the laws of nations, or for those rues which independent states profess or pretend to think themselves bound to observe in their dealings with one another, is often very little more than mere pretence and profession. From the smallest interest, upon the slightest provocation, we see those rules every day, either evaded or directly violated without shame or remorse. Each nation foresees, or imagines it foresees, its own subjugation in the increasing power and aggrandisement of any of its neighbours; and the mean principle of national prejudice is often founded upon the noble one of the love of our own country.
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In this context Smith's celebration of the economic and social utility of self-interest can be understood as containing both 'light' and 'dark' sides which his theory of political economy, and advocacy of the best economic policy for Britain in the late 18 th century, constantly flipped between. On the optimistic view, economic competition could sometimes be guided away from jealousy and envy towards the more noble sentiment of 'emulation' so as to foster economic cooperation and friendship amongst nations. 136 However, this optimism struck against the logic of Smith's economic theory, whereby the core driving sentiment of most economic activity was a self-interested and sometimes selfish one. 137 Further, this optimism struck also against Smith's republican, ethical theory of national patriotism which was linked to the governance goal of stimulating and maintaining economic growth. In this vein Smith argued that:
(T)he great object of the political economy of every country is to increase the riches and power of that country. The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it.... As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial relations of England. 141 Smith's argument in favour of the prudence of suspending the free market 142 and engaging in protectionism as an economic weapon of war should be viewed also in the context of an important historical link Smith makes between wealth and warfare. For Smith the link between the generation of wealth and warfare is located in his account of the historical development of the rising costs of war and the revolution in warfare in Europe. 143 He argued that the cost of the burden of technological warfare (the rise of standing armies, the increased importance of navies, firearms, cannon, etc. 144 ) historically placed demands on states to generate massive revenues to ensure their continued survival. The cost of financing endless European wars meant the creation of new, large bureaucratic organisations necessary for the collection and administration of taxation. 145 In time, the cost of buying and producing armaments, the payment of military personnel and the funding of wars led to the creation of the public debt.
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On Smith's account the concern for wealth generation as a legitimate concern of the art of government was a historical result of the revolution in the technology and strategy of warfare.
Military technology required wealth, and success in war required both. Smith argued:
In ancient times the opulent and civilised found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous nations find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilised. 147 Understood in this context the distinction Smith makes at the very opening of the Wealth of Nations between rich ("civilised and thriving") and poor ("savage") countries 148 is a question deeply related to the concern for self-defence and the changing technological cost of warfare outlined at the end of the work. The economic question Smith pursues about how to generate a wealthy society is inseparable from a concern with the issue of defending the state from external enemies -a concern which leads Smith to worry about the poor health and corruption of the bodies of the working poor when repetitive and mindless modern labour renders them inadequate for fighting. 149 In general terms, for Smith, the military survival of the commercial state is dependent upon being able to pay for the rising cost of warfare and to service the public debt. The preservation of the commercial state is dependent upon it being and remaining wealthy, on socially mobilising the 'pin factory' to pay for the 'war factory.' Under such conditions to be poor is to be trapped on the wrong side of historical and material progress and possibly, to be conquered. (A)rrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect of the rights of one another.
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In such an approach Smith's focus seems much closer to the language and analysis of Niccolò Riches are sought both for the things that are necessary to life, and in order to enjoy pleasures… Magnificent accoutrements and an elegant and plentiful style of life give men further delight. The result of such things is that desire for money has become unlimited. Such expansion of one's personal wealth as harms no one is not, of course, to be disparaged; but committing injustice must always be avoided.
The tension is more pronounced within Grotius' theory of natural law, reflecting an emergence 
